The notion that the use of new media effects a dematerialisation constitutes a kind of lowest common denominator for the various designs of knowledge societies' perspectives: Norbert Wiener's distinction of information from matter and energy turned information into a quantifiable 'universal coin' that permitted all phenomena to be commensurable and transferable under the aspect of their telecommunicational coding, regardless of their spatiotemporal situatedness and their respective meaning. Marshall McLuhan's 'global village' proceeds from the assumption of an electronic shrinkage of spatial distance which enables the realisation of a form of telepresence that supersedes the principle of locality as a sine qua non of interactive communication. 1 Hans Moravec's utopia of 'mind children' projects a transplantation of our mental capability into machines, so that intelligence and information become independent of biological embodiment, and that the body, just as the brain, may degenerate into the dross of an immortalised mind. 2 Then Jean-François Lyotard's Parisian exhibition 'Les Immatériaux ' (1985) staged this tendency towards immaterialisation as a topos in the borderland of science and art, significant for out time. 3 The assumption that the informatisation of the lived-in world leads to a dematerialisation is accompanied by a rhetoric of disappearance: the unity-endowing narrations drop away, the senses dwindle, the signs lose their referents, reality evaporates into hyperreality. Our culture's unconcealed interest in soma -be it in terms of athletical stylisation of the body or as an endorphin-raising, extreme bodily experience -can then be interpreted as a compensation and counter movement to this apparent disembodiment which is supposedly brought about by new media: a fascination both confirmed and approved of simultaneously insofar as these bodily practices are only possible in spaces that are three-dimensional and hazardous, thus real and not virtual.
The following considerations should be taken as a critical comment of the presumption that new media brings about a dematerialisation and disembodiment of our civilisation. The idea of the disappearance of the body under conditions of virtualisation falls short. It is not the dissolution of the body taking place under these conditions, but rather its splitting into both a human body and a data body, its doubling into a physical and a semiotic body. Occurrences in virtual reality -we hereafter make use of the expression 
Vertigo in virtual space?
There is a remarkable phenomenon which Jay David Bolter calls attention to: 5 there is barely one sensation which more sustainably and radically asserts our having a body and its actual determination by its position in space than the phenomenon of vertigo. People who suffer from acrophobia are hardly capable of stepping on high balconies, climbing towers, or taking transparent lifts. Being exposed to such circumstances causes somatic afflictions which can assume the characteristics of pathological anxiety reactions:
heart complaint, sweating hands, feeling of oppression, paralysis. 6 Yet fear of heights is only perceived when one's body is actually placed in an elevated position. If virtual realities depend upon disembodiment, acrophobics who step on a virtual suspension bridge or enter virtual lifts via immersion techniques should not suffer from any physical discomfort. However, that is not the case. At Georgia Institute of Technology, three computer-generated virtual spaces were designed: a balcony situated high-up and providing a downward
view, an open lift, and building-to-building suspension bridges. Acrophobia patients who entered these virtual installations did not only exhibit each somatic symptom but were even cured with the aid of these virtual spaces.
Thus, the mere simulated presence of the body in the data world is perceived as a real presence and triggers physical, anxious reactions in one's own body.
How can that be? Bolter, with good reason, suspects this is not due to realistic depiction, for the phobia producing virtual realities are strongly simplified and at best coarsely operating with photo realistic, illusionary techniques. Rather, what counts is the fact that the setting 'stepped into' reacts to 4 By the term "virtual reality" we refer to technologies which allow for the integration of a user into computer generated environments, therewith enabling him to interact with the data universe. On this term, see Bühl 1996, p. 53. 5 Bolter 1996 6 Hodges et al. 1995 the user's respective body movements. Obviously, an interaction takes place between the user's physical body, fitted with a data suit and a head-mounted display (HMD), and his virtual body, situated on the suspension bridge. But this virtual body is only present in terms of the respective viewpoint from which the virtual environment presents itself to the user's eyes via HMD.
Hence, in this case, the interaction is only present and embodied in terms of the perspectives which are constantly changed in respect to the movements of the user's physical body. Nevertheless, whilst the actual body only seems to be high up, the semiotic body -taken to be a point of view from a certain altitude -is actually present on the suspension bridge.
Let's have a closer look at this relation between virtuality, illusory placing and interaction.
What does 'virtuality' mean?
Elena Esposito originated the idea of associating 'virtuality' with illusory placing thereby introducing the well acquainted phenomenon of mirror images to explain 'virtual'. 7 'Virtual' is a term in optics which refers to images not based on light rays spreading linearly. Reflections, for instance, are virtual, insofar as they convey the impression of the mirrored objects as if they were actually located behind the mirror surface. Thus virtuality not only produces illusory objects, but provides real objects with illusory placings. In this way, seeing things from front and behind simultaneously, or seeing oneself with the eyes of the others, becomes possible. Even so we have no chance of stepping into the mirror image. We have to change the world in front of the mirror for the world in the mirror to be changed. Indeed, reflections are images, but not signs of the reflected objects. 8 By extrapolating the mirror metaphor we can make a first attempt to grasp what 'computer generated virtualisation' means. Imagine that there is a technology (a) allowing us to step into the mirror world and to interact with the mirrored objects, whilst (b) what is mirrored is not simply things, but signs resp. symbol worlds. Computer generated virtual realities are immersive reflections of symbolic universes, in which a user can interact with symbol structures.
However, there is a bottleneck that must be passed through from the real to the virtual and vice versa, and this is only achievable by semiotisation.
For the user this means that an immersion in the virtual world can only succeed provided a mapping of his corporeal body to a data body, which acts as an arbitrary symbolic (re-)construction of the viewpoint and movement of the physical body, is carried out. This can be accomplished by information 7 Esposito 1995 8 Eco 1988 technologically upgrading the body with a data suit, helmet and gloves, or more subtly, via scanning or detecting the body by means of video cameras. What it comes down to is that positions and movements of body parts are recorded, digitised and made present by a "sign body" in virtual space as a representation of the physical body. This presence of the "sign body" can be implicit in terms of the viewpoint which determines the respective perspective under which a scenery appears as a function of the user's ocular movements.
Or this presence can be explicit in terms of an arrow, a stylised hand, or any 10 "Tele-embodiment is the technically supported act of being in spatial and temporal coincidence with other humans." Lozano-Hemmer 1996, p. 142. incorporate: they coincide. The principle (valid for physical reality) that two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time does not apply anymore:
The "flesh body" of one person, and the "sign body" of another are in the same "position". The imperative of distance does not hold. 'Illusory placing', which we introduced as a defining criterion of the virtual, consists of just this trick of zero distance.
But is that which is placeable in an illusory manner still a body at all? And is where it is placed, still a space at all? Differently put, if we continue calling the data body "body" and calling virtual spaces "spaces", how does the concept of body and the concept of space have to change for such designations not to become meaningless? Answering these questions remains a research task, but at least some directions emerge. For one thing, the conceptual transformations have to do with the altered relation between space and time -space here taken as three-dimensional, physical space -and for another thing, they have to do with the relation between space and personspace here taken as social space.
Space and time: The implementation of time into sign configurations
What does the proficiency of computer generated virtuality consist of?
The buzzword "interactivity" can show us a way. What "interaction" means is familiar from verbal conversation: 'Ego' and 'Alter' reciprocally refer to one another in what they say and how they say it. And we are just as acquainted with the intervention of writing to split up communication and interaction:
wherever is written, the readers are absent, wherever is read, the author is.
Indeed the symbolic register of literality (we can also say, cultural techniques) rests upon our ability to produce, look at, convert, interpret and erase signs.
And yet they still elude interaction. We know about interacting with persons, with animals, too, and even with things on a limited scale, but an interactivity involving symbols is unknown to us. And that does not only bear on our dealing with texts, but likewise includes our relation to images. 11
Is it by chance that spatiality is the fundamental medium of this symbolic register of literacy? A complex link between the culture of literacy and the medial order of spatiality is touched upon here. There are several phenomena which testify to such a connection:
(1) For one thing, there is the privileging of eyesight, dating back to
Greek Antiquity. 12 This, however, is a sense by which the manifold can be surveyed side by side, i.e. simultaneously, and whose capability furthermore increases, not diminishes, with the distance to the viewed object.
(2) For another thing, there is the -mostly remaining implicit -identification of language with script (Schrift): nearly all theories of language draw their idea of language from the model of script, which, however, is a language modality which makes use of the potential for representation of spatio-visual configurations by which language advances to an image, namely to a script figure (Schriftbild).
(3) And lastly, there is the fact that we even represent time itself only by means of visual schemes, be it a point of time, an arrow of time, or a space of time: whenever we indicate temporality, time is spatialised.
The use of computers presents a kind of cultural technique inasmuch as the cultural techniques of literacy such as reading, writing and arithmetic rest upon the exclusion of interaction with symbols, whereas that of computer utilisation, however, rests upon the inclusion of interacting with symbols.
This ability to interact with symbol structures -and that is the supposition that it comes down to -becomes possible only by the implementation of time into symbolic configurations. Well, how is that to be understood?
Virtually all metaphors used to describe the forms and practices that have arisen in dealing with information called on conceptions of space (be it the "data universe", the "net", or the "desktop") as an organisational principle of a computer's user interface. Yet the assumption of this preference for the semantic field of spatiality does not account for the future impulses by which computers will shape our access to and handling of information -impulses which consist in the implementation of temporality into forms of symbols we traditionally organised as spatial relations. Writing, text and the book: of these media it is a characteristic -unlike the fluid word, barely uttered, already fading away -to display a time-resistant stability. Although each reading process creates a unique text for the reader and, during repeated reading a varied one as well, the texture conceived as a legible structure of significants remains stable. Therefore, if the transition 13 from orality to literacy in medial 12 Riedel 1984 13 The word "transition" here does not mean a substitutional relation of orality by literacy, of which there is none in this naive form, but is meant in the sense of a systematic distinguishability. respects can be described as a spatialisation, then the transition from literacy to telematics lies in a temporalisation.
David Gelernter assumes that we are standing at the verge of a period in which computers mainly "deal with palpable time -with visualised, concrete time." 14 There is something static and immanent to space, yet time flows (by).
The fluent current, i.e. no longer the cabinet and the document kept therein, becomes the essential organisational principle of information. If temporality becomes inherent in data structures -this being Gelernter's speculation -information which is accessible and processable via computers does not remain in the shape of "documents" but takes on that of "cyber bodies". It is then organised like a "life stream". Approaches to a non-Cartesian conception of the body become visible here: a body is taken as an entity in flow which is not defined anymore by its position in space, but by its changing in time.
The basic idea of this speculation, that the implementation of time into data structures would make a significant difference between the "register of 
Space and body: the constitution of corporeity by central perspective and virtual reality
Through his distinction of "res extensa" and "res cogitans", Descartes did not only determine the "body" by its difference to mind, but at the same time he grasped the notion of matter as spatial extension, i.e. identifying the physical body with a geometric body. In order to find an answer to that, we have to look at which shape the semiotisation takes, i.e. the inevitable passing through the bottleneck when entering into online communication.
First, script becomes the medium of synchronicity. 17 Usually, script disrupts communication: writing and reading disengage not only from the immediateness, spontaneity, irreversible fluidity of actual communication, but also from the communicators' entanglement. Between the production and reception of texts a time interval intervenes. And that even holds for email or partaking in Usenet 18 , both of which are kinds of asynchronous communication where the participants are not simultaneously involved in communication.
This changes with telematic communication in which script -or more precisely the use of keyboard and display -obtains a new purpose, insofar as it 17 As to the altered role of writing, see Bolter 1997; Sandbothe 1997. enables the simultaneous exchange between spatially absent persons. With this, script enters into functions which, in face-to-face conversation, voicebound speech does fulfil. Yet unlike the indexically meaningful voice, which in speaking always asserts the trace of the body, the script figure (Schriftbild) entered via the keyboard draws on the potential of anonymisation that is linked to script as an option. Due to the relatedness of online communication to script, those partaking in it appear pseudonymously.
We can distinguish two facets of this "pseudonym-isation": (1) an arbitrarisation of the name, and (2) a staging of personal identity. As to (1): no nameno account! Having an addressable name is required for participating in web interaction. In ordinary life, our proper name is an attribute of our personality. It renders ourselves identifiable and gives us a singularity -before any biological, psychic or social development of individuality. The proper name assigns us a well-defined place in social space and social time. We do not create our proper name, but we receive it. And it endows personal identity just by virtue of that dimension in which it is not left to our power of disposition. This is quite different for the name under which we act in the web: it is chosen by ourselves, a product of a self-determined staging. This name provides an attributability which can permit remaining anonymous to the person connected to it. This name is a depersonalising one. As to (2): the choice of a name is complemented by an artificial identity. By the @describe me as command we project and produce an identity staged according to outer and inner attributes. The arbitrary character of these "self"-descriptions comes glaringly to light with the @gender command. Admittedly the web identity calls for a specification of gender all along, but which "gender-flag" is set is left to the participants.
The division of person and persona
So we can see from the start, the mode of writing in online communication facilitates the operation of what are no longer persons but rather arbitrary descriptions of persons, i.e. staged identities behind which all the same programmes can be concealed. We shall label this personification of arbitrary descriptions, 'persona'. 'Persona' is derivative of 'per-sonare', "to sound through" and originally means the mask through which the ancient actor speaks his role. So, does the splitting into a real person and a virtual persona imply a theatricalisation of computer generated communication? Does telematic communication become a procedure related to proceedings on a stage?
Let us start from one popular case that has been frequently discussed in the debate on the usage of computers. 19 Under the name of 'legba' a woman from Seattle acts in a MUD 20 on the Internet. A participant going by the alias of 'Mr. Bungle' succeeds in cutting the real woman's control over her alias existence by use of a programming trick to then involve her in a violent pornographic interaction. For the public, reading along interestedly, the impression is conveyed that 'legba' does not only consent to her simulated rape but actively partakes in it. After another persona acting under the alias of 'starsinger' is driven to simulated self-mutilation by 'Mr. Bungle' using the same hack, a 'wizard' who has insight into the 'lower' code interrupts the affair and throws 'Mr. Bungle' out of the virtual scene. Then, via a mailing list the woman from Seattle makes the events known to the web public; further, the virtual community builds an ad-hoc government, which ostracises 'Mr.
Bungle', whose personal identity of course remains unknown.
So what is the moral of the story? All acting in the web is acting by signs and thereby draws on the difference between 'word' and 'thing'. So the obnoxiousness of this episode does not lie in the description of rape -for the description of rape is not rape, at best a piece of pornography originated with this. The obnoxiousness lies in the violently interrupted influence of the real person over her virtual persona.
Yet if that is the case, a crucial difference shows up between a virtual communication environment and theatrical events on the stage. An actor is indeed responsible for good or bad acting, however, not for whether he plays the part of a good or bad character. But even so, a real participant in online communication stays in connection with his artificial identity in such a way that his responsibility for what he does in communicating, even in the web, is not suspended in principle. Nevertheless, the constitutional "pseudonymity" creates a particular state of affairs that results in the development of normative practices in virtual communities which exclusively refer to the web personae and by no means -see the treatment of 'Mr. Bungle' -to the real persons they are associated with.
On universal pragmatic theory of communication
Let us take a step towards contemporary speech act and communication theory. Universal pragmatic theory of communication as elaborated by Karl Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas typically links John Langshaw Austin's idea to grasp speaking as a kind of doing, with the idea that a speaker can count as a personification of claims to be argued formal-rationally, i.e. a speaking 19 Dibbel 1994; Turkle 1995, pp. 250-254; Sandbothe 1998 situation being of sublimely juridical resp. contractual structure. Basically, this subliminal juridification of communication in universal pragmatic communication theory is about explaining the detachment of the factual and the relational aspect in speech by the fact that in speaking we raise validity claims of truth, truthfulness and correctness, which the addressed can then -with good reason -accept or reject. The power of the better argument is the sole criterion for acceptance or rejection. And it is language itself which -by distinguishing 'communication' from 'discourse', by switching between these two levels, and by enabling an interruption of communication and entering into discourse -opens the possibility of rationally negotiating and deciding the validity claim at issue whenever disagreement arises in the spontaneous flow of communication. Discourse becomes the place where -after Habermas -abstaining from all corporeal, psychological or social differences, we are considered the mere personification of the uniformly distributed ability to defend or overthrow validity claims by arguing. 21 Speaking under the idealised conditions of discourse becomes the possibility to be right. This is what is meant by the latently juridical structure of communication theory. But at the same time, speech act and communication theory make use of idealisation assumptions which seem to be fulfilled exactly in virtual, not in actual life-world communication. Included in this, for example, is that in speaking we have to act as beings that are bared of all corporeal, gender-, social and geographic differences and who merely have to behave as par- 21 Habermas 1984, p. 353 ticipants provided with equal chances in communication. Where, if not in a disembodied, "pseudonym-ised", computer mediated interaction, is such a condition given? 22
Personae as participants in virtual communities
Regarding the form of communication emerging under such conditions, two things attract attention: (a) whereas in the theory of universal pragmatism, "to communicate" and "to argue" concur -at least in discourse -this is not the case in web communication. Communicating here is not arguing, but is a kind of reference to other personae, by responding to others and therefore becoming a participant. The maxim of web communication lies not in argumentative rationality, rather in interactive connectability. (b) Accepting 'the other as participant in interactive events' constitutes a kind of acknowledgment relation that entails the personae to actually form respective issueoriented virtual communities, which then develop their own kinds of rules.
If, for instance, in order to attract attention a novice within a certain MUD is overly hasty with a 'whuggle' i.e. a virtual hug, this violates the web-etiquette and will lead to the novice being overlooked rather than integrated into the chat.
When relatability and 'being present' become the point of reference for communication, it has consequences for the modality of community-fostering possibilities of regulation and sanctioning. If -as Mike Sandbothe rightly emphasises 23 -it is correct that the internet does not constitute an anarchic space, but rather that proper methods of sanctioning misconduct have evolved, then the specificity of these methods consists just in influencing this very relatability and 'being present' and, if need be, in prohibiting it. The scale goes from being ignored by the participants to actual expulsion by a 'wizard'. At all times, however, it is a question of a persona being accepted as a playmate or not. Communicative interaction in virtual communities has the status of game moves. 24 The question arises whether this phenomenon of our communication (aiming as it does, less at the defence of validity claims than at the avoidance of discontinuation of interaction), does not apply to any communication. Moreover, does the divergence of person and persona indicate that in our 'ordinary lives' too, our personality emerges from the sublime interplay of the person individuated by its proper name and the persona staged by us?
Conclusion
The starting point of our reflections was the question whether virtualisation leads to dematerialisation, disembodiment, and de-personalisation, a point about which we were decidedly sceptical. Our argumentation comprised of two steps: (1) virtualisation as a possibility of interactivity with symbol structures. The practices of literacy familiar to us rest upon our ability to create, transform, store, erase, but above all, interpret signs. Yet direct interaction with symbolic worlds is excluded by these same practices. Facilitating interactivity with semiotic structures is nevertheless possible through computermediated virtualisation. And (2) semiotisation of the user as a precondition of acting in cyberspace. The user, however, can enter into a synchronous reciprocity with signs if and only if he himself is subject to a semiotic metamorphosis. What this semiotic transformation amounts to has to be answered differently for the case of virtual reality on the one hand, and that of telematic communication on the other. (a) To plunge into virtual realities, the user has to split up into a physical body that 'counts' as an embodiment of a computable motion grid, and a data body which, in virtual reality, acts as a symbol structure. The movement of the physical body becomes the condition of the possibility of activating the data body. 'Flesh body' and 'sign body' are distinguishable but correlate and, by that interplay, introduce the question for the modification of our conception of the body. (b) To partake in telematic communication, the user has to assume a self-staged identity and split up into a real person and a virtual persona. Insofar as the personae depend on acknowledgment as participants in online communication, virtual communities develop their own standards and practices of sanctioning, which however assume the character of game moves, as the exclusion of a persona from the communicational events constitutes the most radical kind of sanctioning.
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